Trade Unions in Korea
PARK YOUNG-KI
PROFFESSOR, SOGANG UNIVERSITY
PROFFESSOR, SOGANG UNIVERSITY
The labor union movement in Korea at the crossroads. Unlike unions in other industrializing economies (NIEs) in Asia, it is true that the number of organized workers in Korea has increased substantially since 1987. It is also true that in spite of business slow down and repressive government labor policies the unions in Korea successfully organized a series of nationwide political strikes with a measure of success. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), a national trade union centre, formed among unions established after the change of government to a more democratic one, is now busy campaigning after nominating it's president as candidate in the forthcoming presidential election to be held on December 18th(1). Along with other progressive forces imbued with reformist ideas of various hues, the leaders of the KCTU and of its member organizations is also engaged in forming a political party, whose objective will be not only to protect the interests of the wage earners but also for all the underprivileged and the urban poor whom, they believe, have so far been denied their fair share of the industrial progress our economy has achieved(2).
Despite these impressive developments related to organized labor, observers in general, however, believe that the Korean labor movement, unlike at it's height in the late 1980s, has lost its dynamism and will continue to lose it as we move into what is known as a global economy. As the new economic order emerges, where ideas of neo-liberalism competition and the survival of the fittest are accepted not only as a legitimate but also a fair rule of the game, unions, they believe, will continue to lose their influence to the point where they will no longer be an important political, economic, or a social force. They believe that the survival of the union will increasingly be at stake unless the union restructures its organization so as to accommodate not only the shrinking number of constantly employed production workers but also incorporate all those rapidly increasing marginal as well as contingent workers into its structure, and develop a new function that will be geared to improve and protect not only the interests of its member, but also help harness the competitive edge of our national economy. Observers, therefore, believe that if unions are to ensure their role in a new world economic order, it is an inevitable mandate for them to develop measures to make use all the ever-advancing technologies and readjust their role so as to become compatible with the flexible and innovative type of strategic management.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the changes taking place in the world of employment and their implications for the future of the labor movement is Korea. Though it is true that the changes in the business environment is only part of the forces that affect unionism, the change in union membership in the light of socio-economic change in particular and its consequences upon the future of workers organization will be focused in this paper.
Ups and Down of Union Membership
Union membership in Korea was at an all-time high in 1989, when nearly two million workers - 1,932 thousands - with an organizational rate of close to twenty percent - 19.8 - were represented by the labor organization.(Table`)
It was the political events of 1987 that had brought about this profound change in the labor movement in Korea. In April 1987, the military government declared its intention to suspend discussions on the issue of constitutional reform the thus further delay the introduction of direct presidential elections.
This came amid growing public support for the return of democratic processes and sparked widespread demonstrations and national civil disorder. The decision of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), then the only trade union national confederation, to support the government's position also helped to fuel a campaign of industrial stoppages and added to calls for the recognition of autonomous unions.
In the face of this opposition, the government bowed to national pressure and announced that it would permit presidential elections by direct popular vote and accept significant political liberalization(3). This decision was followed by a period of unprecedented industrial unrest. Between July and September 1987, there were over 3,200 strikes, - more than had occurred over the preceding five years (Tablea). Most of these were fought over demands for higher wages and the freedom to establish independent unions.
In the period since 1987, therefore, the labor union movement has begun to enjoy a quite different socio-political environment. It enjoyed an environment that may be described as an era of reluctant acceptance if not de facto guarantee of union organization by both business and government. In the period between 1987 to 1993 unions along with other progressive social forces, student organizations in particular, in fact, played the role of a major political force that helped restore democratic rule in Korea. Union activities, therefore, had, in general, been backed by popular support. Hence, the union had not only a voice but it also carried some weight.
Prior to this change union membership was largely restricted to production workers. Since 1987, however, union membership has expanded into a number of other industries and occupations. These include clerical and professional employees, the media, primary and secondary teachers and researchers. Hitherto these groups had been systematically excluded by the government from unionization or had distanced themselves from involvement with labor activities. Furthermore, unions have begun to form among employees in business conglomerates, which prior to 1987 remained free from unionization because of both over and covert protection extended by the government. In the wake of the nation-wide strikes in 1987, most foreign invested firms such as IBM, Motorola, Chase Manhattan, and Citi Corp, firms all known for their sophisticated management practices and the positive labor relations programs in particular that helped them maintain a union-free business environment at home, had also became unionized in Korea.
The nationwide pressure to establish unions after the explosion of strikes in 1987 was first met by a range of unfair employer labor practices. In most cases, however, as the government withdrew its support from the companies, the employers' attempt to oppose unionization failed. As employees began to succeed in their efforts to establish new unions, employer resistance gradually subsided. In the period between August 1987 and December 1989 the number of organized workers increased from 1,050 thousands to 1,932 thousands workers(4).
Largely due to this unprecedented increase of union membership and revitalization of its activities, not seldom accompanied with work stoppages and violent clashes between strikers and workers, knows as KUSADAE, mobilized by the company and police, the organized workers have also succeeded in raising their wage and average of 15 percent a year for the last ten years. The real wage of workers in the manufacturing industry, for example, increased more than two and a half times during this period (Table b).
Witnessing the rapid increase of wage rates and the accompanying industrial unrest in particular, a sentiment hostile toward the union once again began to build up among business and the conservative political forces (Tablea,c).
Claiming that in this era of global competition confrontational type labor relations can not be afforded, businesses and their representative organization such as the Federation of Korean Employers Association, began to advocate a new system of labor relations that will help to improve labor market flexibility and put and end to adversarial-type labor relations. Though these were no attempt to amend the labor law, the government policies, by means of adjudication and the issuance of executive orders and guidelines, once again became inclined to concern itself more with issues related to the competitive edge of the national economy than with trade union rights. As a civilian government was launched in 1993, after more than thirty years of rule by ex-military generals, and as the government was relieved from the burden of proving its legitimacy, the government officially began to reassess its labor policies that had become, since 1987 lenient toward workers' organized activities to the extent of accepting collective bargaining and workers' collective activities. The government's rhetoric was that in order to survive in this new world economic order and to maintain the competitive edge of our economy, it is a necessity for government to promote free play of the market mechanism and to minimize all negative effects of institutions that may work against improving the competitiveness of our economy in the global market.
Imbued with these ideas, the government once again has began to introduce measures designed to discourage workers' attempts to organize and programs to curtail the work of collective bargaining. Since early 1990 the official interpretation of the laws ceased to support the cause of workers and began to discredit some of the legitimate functions of organized workers. The case of cannibalization of a union formed among workers of the government-owned and-run steel mill industry may well illustrate the nature of this change.
In 1988, immediately after the series of nation-wide strikes, a union was formed among employees of Pohang Steel Mill Corporation (POSCO), the government-owned giant steel mill corporation, where more than twenty-five thousands production workers are employed, producing twenty million tons of iron and steel products per year. In early 1988, as the government changed to a more democratic one, the Chief Executive Officer of POSCO expressed his willingness to work along with the union should the workers decide to form one. Encouraged by this change of management labor policy, workers of POSCO formed a union and its membership increased to 18,000 by the end of 1989. As the government labor policy once again turned back to a conservative tune, however, POSCO management's labor policy has also change. Hithereto, union leaders and union activists had to go through all sorts of anti-union harassment, which finally ended the de facto debacle of union organization. Union membership rapidly decreased from 18,000 workers in 1989 to a mere 23 employees by the end of 1996(5). The dwarfed POSCO union is now considered to exist not to protect the interest of POSCO employees but to the help company maintain a union-free business environment. A provision in the Labor Law forbids a new union to be formed where there already exists a union. The law does not specify the minimum quorum for the legal recognition of a union(6).
With the change of government policies from protecting workers rights to overseeing or often discouraging collective activities of the workers in the name of free play of market mechanism, private firms have also joined the campaign to challenge and discredit workers' organized activities. Now it is not seldom extended to busting existing union organizations.
Largely due to this change in the politico-economic climate, which began from early 1989 onward, union membership has decreased considerably. It has decreased from 1,932 thousands in 1989 to 1,615 thousands workers by the end of 1995. Hence, since early 1990 more than 300,000 workers left union either because of disappointment or because of successful anti-union programs launched by management. The organizational rate has also dropped by 8.4 percent from 23.7 percent in 1989 to 15.3 percent the by the end of 1995.
Before speculating on the future of the Korean labor movement, an analysis of the forces that helped to expedite the decrease of union membership may provide the readers with some clues to see the possible development of Korean unions in the future.
Change in Managerial labor Policies and Practices
As in the other countries the increased business competition accompanying the new world economic order is also known as the most formidable force that caused a sudden decrease of union membership in Korea. In order to survive in this new economic order and to cope with the increased business competition in particular, employers in general blatantly claim that it is inevitable for them but to introduce all types of pro-active and re-active measures that will help defeat unions in their organizing attempts and at the bargaining table.
At one extreme are the pro-active tactics in which employers attempt to discourage unionism while more or less complying with labor legislation. It is now a known secret that, whether they are business conglomerates, state enterprises, small-or medium-sized business, or whether the union was formed before or after 1987, the prevailing sentiment among business managers is to operate in a union-free environment. As in the case of high tech and prospering blue chip industries in the US such as IBM and Hewlett Packard etc., Samsung, one of the leading business conglomerates which coincidentally happens to be the partner company of Hewlett Packard in Korea, has also succeeded in remaining free from unionization among its employees even in the wake of strikes in 1987(7).
The employers' interest in avoiding unions, of course, does not mean they disregard worker's complaints. Rather, with the introduction of what is known as positive labor relations programs, i.e. Quality of Working Life (QWL), Total Quality Management (TQM), and Quality Circle (QC) etc; they claim that they are committed to providing their employees with the fair and attractive work environment. Hence, they claim that there is no valid reason for a third party (the union) to exist. To make sure that the union-free business environment prevails, the employer so far has tried to adhere to policies that may be summarized as follows(8):
1.
Pay above average wage for good performance and monitor the wage structure in each market so as to assure that the terms and conditions do not slip behind that of organized labor.
2.
Provide perks and fringe benefits for non-union employees which are comparable with or better than those in union plants, and introduce new fringe benefits programs to their non-union employees before a union terms them to unionize and act collective.
3.
As long as employees perform well in their current positions, accommodate individual preferences for work assignments and schedules. Refrain from penalizing them for turning down new assignments. Tolerate employees who decline to work overtime because of various personal reasons.
4.
Solicit employees' criticism and questions in a fair, sensitive, and intelligent way, with newly developed managerial practices that place emphasis on employee participation into the managerial decision-making process. Hence, never leave room for a union to have any justification to begin or to continue.
The company, in brief, has now developed and makes use of a wide range of new systems and mechanisms that encourages the employees to tell the company the reasons why they do not follow company policies and through which employees can put forward most of their grievances. The rationale of this line of employees' policy, in other words, is that if for any reason employee feel they can not be satisfied distrust will develop and then they may ultimately perceive the need for a union to protect their rights.
At the other extreme are companies that openly defy union and employee organizing and bargaining rights. Not infrequently they violate the law, even by means of planting informers among their own employees. Such non-accommodating, negative policies of management toward unions are now being carried out and not seldom with help from the government whose policy priority is once again placed on the issue of economic recovery and the restoration and maintenance of a competitive edge in the international market.
The middle ground is occupied by business that hire consulting firms and lawyers to prevent or defeat a labor unions' from organizing and any other forms of collective activities.
Regardless of the approach taken by management to curb organized workers, the result has proved that new management policies and tactics have been quite effective and have increasingly posed a threat to the survival of unionism. The threat will grow unless unions develop a means to cope with this new managerial scheme in the future.
Change in the Political Environment
In addition to ever increased business competition and aggressive and hostile management labor policies designed to create and maintain a union-free business environment, another force that helped to reduce union membership may be the change, or lack of change in the mindset of political forces and decision makers in government offices. The general sentiment among those in the political arena has returned to that of the pre-1987 mentality. Government by means of administrative applications once again began to introduce various types of restrictive measures over union activities.
Recent changes in the labor policies of two leading politicians may well illustrate the nature of these changes. Kim Young-sam, incumbent president and Kim Dae-jung, leader of the major opposition party and now running for the office of president at the most hopeful candidate, were one known as supporters of the cause of workers. It was specially true during the days of military rule. In fact, it was these Kims who struggled side by side with workers for the restoration of democracy in the country until 1993. It was the incumbent President Kim Young-sam, who during the period of military rule as leader of the major opposition party, extended help to the striking workers of the YH Apparel Trade Company that served as a catalyst to end and finally oust the 18-year military rule of Park Chung-Hee. Both Kims, however, are now considered to be keeping their distance from workers.
As Kim Yong-sam was elected and assumed the office of president in early 1993, his line of policies has changed profoundly, placing all his policy priority on economic growth and on issues that will help to improve the competitive edge of our national economy. Progressive platforms and the rhetoric he once advocated, and the slogans that helped him to be known as a progressive minded politician supporting the cause of workers, ceased to be his programs. Instead, after the became the president, he began to introduce a series of labor policies that may at best be summarized as promoting labor market flexibility and designed to increase the competitive edge of the national economy. In addition to the rapid progress of globalization, his need to mobilize the support of the middle income group and the business community in particular, or to realize his policy of sustained economic growth, may have caused this change.
The case of Kim Dae-jung is not much different. As he failed several attempts to be elected as president, and as he has now become the leading candidate in the forthcoming presidential race, he has also changed his political platform from that of pro-labor to what he often calls the policy of middle of the road. Progressive labor policies he once advocated, such as the guarantee of basic trade union rights not only for workers in the private sectors but also to public servants is now no longer on his agenda.
An amendment to the labor legislation that took place on March 9th this year may well illustrate the change in the labor policies of these two Kims. Organized labor, inclusive of unions affiliated with the FKTU, called nation-wide work stoppage in order to prevent the government draft bill from being passed and to influence the opposition parties to include the union proposal in the new labor law. The government proposal, in brief, may be described as that of adhering to the principle of "employment at will", either banning or imposing restrictions upon the right to organize among either public servants or the private sector. The union efforts, however, resulted only finding that government is more concerned with economic recovery and a system providing free play to the market mechanism.
It also has became clear that though Kim Dae-Jung has kept promising to promote the cause of workers he is now more concerned with the support of middle income groups and the business community. In other words, the unions failed to secure support of either the ruling party of Kim Young-Sam or of the opposition party led by Kim Dar-Jung. Workers' demand for a guarantee of basic rights and that Korean labor law be brought in line with international standards failed to materialize.
The Legalistic Encroachment on Labor Relations
Labor legislation in Korea is unique in the sense that worker's rights to form a union and to engage in collective actions are guaranteed in the Constitutional Law. Union rights guaranteed in the Constitutional Law have been spelled out in detail in three major pieces of Labor legislation: the Labor Standards Law, the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Law, and the Labor Relations Commission Law(9). Each of these laws was enacted in 1953 and each has been amended several times, the changes usually coinciding with a change of government. The most recent amendments to these laws occurred in March this year. It is widely thought that Korean membership in international organizations, the ILO and OECD in particular, was one of the major forces that precipitated the most recent amendment.
The underlying philosophy and characteristics of the labor law framework demonstrate support for collective bargaining and encouragement for independent and responsible unionism. As the law has been enacted it ahs both helped and hindered the labor movement. When organized labor began to make significant membership gains in the late 60s, largely due to the increased number of industrial workers, it did so because of the provisions in the labor union law. The law protected employees who wanted to join, form, or assist a labor organization. A provision in the Labor Union Law, in fact, defines it legal to have a compulsory union membership scheme such as union shop in case the union secures more than a majority of the workers in a business establishment(10). Due to this legal protection union membership substantially increased even during the period of Yushin rule, an era during which the president exercised unlimited administrative power(11).
Labor legislation, on the other hand, has also encroached upon the legitimate role of union and collective bargaining activities by providing a monopoly of worker's organized activities only to those approved by the government. The provision of a union monopoly that permits only unions which have completed registration with the government to function and provides only them with legal protection, was first introduced by the military government in 1963. This provision has not only tarnished the union image but has also helped to build a wide gap between the leaders and rank and file. It also has helped to erect an antagonistic attitude among workers toward government. It was this antagonistic attitude that brought about the birth of the rival labor organization, the Korean Confederation of Trade unions. KCTU, even to this date, has failed to be registered with the government and continues as an organization existing outside the legal domain. Prior to 1987, in spite of a substantial increase in membership, the government-approved unions seldom helped protect employees from unfair treatment or from unsafe working conditions. Rather than the union, it was always the government that helped workers obtain improved pay and employee benefits either by means of administrative measures or by introducing pieces of substantive labor legislation. Unions, in other words, failed to function as a legitimate representative organization that squarely protects and promotes the interests of its members.
One of the by-products of labor legislation of this nature and of the revitalized activities of unions since 1987, may be the sudden improvement of personnel/human resource management programs and policies in recent years. Programs of positive labor relations have increasingly been introduced. New programs usually encourage employee participation into the managerial decision-making process but always on an individual basis. In order to realize these new human resource management programs and to promote cooperative types of labor relations a new law, the Workers Participation and Promotion of Labor-Management Cooperation Law (WPPLMCL) was enacted in March this year(12). Experiences seems to suggests that the more these improved personnel policies and programs are used in business establishments, the more difficult it has become for unions to organize non-union employees.
Choices for the Future
a. Legal Structure
To embark on a cooperative type of labor relations, one issue that needs to be addressed is the change of the labor relations law, so as to protect not only basic trade union rights but also to improve national competitiveness and maintain a legislative framework that will help balance the workers' right with economic efficiency.
In March this year, government amended labor related laws. The Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform (PCIR) was set up in early May 1996, with a mandate to forge the reform of industrial relations and to prepare a report for the Government on how to improve the labor relations law that has been criticized not only in international circles, but also among the business community in Korea. The Commission was composed of representatives from labor, management and public interest groups. Since its inception the Commission has examined a number of controversial provisions in the labor relations law, especially the one said to contradict the principle of Freedom of Association. Though the Commission claims that it succeeded in revising or formulating more than 100 provisions, including the abolishment of the prohibition of political activities by trade unions, the PCIR failed to reach on agreement on major issues related to freedom of association. Included are controversial issues such as recognizing multiple trade unions and the right of public servants and teachers to organize. On December 26th, 1996 the Government clandestinely enacted the repressive labor law which had to be amended in order to bring Korean law into line with international standards. The new labor law amended in December 1996, was greeted by not only a series of strikes by the workers in Korea, but also became a target of criticism in the in the international community, including the ILO. Due to union opposition to the amendment and to strong protests in the international circle, in March this year the government repealed the law as amended in December and again revised the labor legislation. The labor Relations Law following the 1997 March amendment, however, does not differ much from the amendment made in December 1996. The government assured the international communities, by solemn commitments to both the ILO and OECD, that is would bring contradicting labor laws in line with international standards(13). The new law demonstrates few elements that will be accepted as improvements in line with core ILO conventions, especially the one on the Freedom of Association, in particular as it refers to the servants.
Some of the controversial provisions of the new "Labor Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Law" may be summerized as follows:
a.
Unlike the law of 1996, the restriction on union pluralism at the industrial, federations, and national centre level has been lifted. At the enterprise level, however, restriction remains in force until the year 2002. Restrictions on union membership and qualifications for holding union office also remain. This, in essence, upholds the legal ban on the KCTU and hence the KCTU is forced to remain outside of legal protection.
b.
The prohibition on "third party intervention" has been considerably weakened and unions are now permitted to receive assistance from federations or confederations to which they are affiliated. But the law has introduced a new requirement for unions to register with the government additional persons from whom they seek assistance.
c.
A new provision has been introduced that defines it as legal to employ new hands in place of striking workers. Striking workers can henceforth be replaced by workers from outside the enterprise. Enterprises affected by industrial disputes may subcontract workers during the duration of a strike.
d.
The list of essential services, in which arbitration is compulsory and industrial action thus forbidden, remains far beyond those generally accepted by international standards, such as the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association. Petroleum supply and the Mint, for example, have been added to a list, which includes trains, buses, water, electricity and gas supply, oil refineries, public hygiene and medical facilities, banking, broadcasting and communications.
e.
Dismissed workers are now banned from exercising their right to union membership, although, if a dismissal is under review of the Central Labor Relations Commission, the measure remains suspended until the dismissal is upheld by the Commission.
f.
During industrial disputes, occupation of production lines by striking workers is now forbidden.
g.
The law forbids the employer from paying workers while they are on strike.
h.
It is now forbidden for enterprises to pay full-time union officers or award them any compensation.
i.
The ban on unionization in the public sector and the teaching profession inclusive of those in the private schools continues to remain in place.
The reaction of KCTU and FKTU to these controversial provisions in the new labor law was organizational opposition, which, conbined with dissatisfaction among workers over the new labor law will most likely force another in the law change soon as the new government comes into power early next year.
In addition to the Collective Labor Relations Law, the Labor Standards Law was also been amended in March this year. The government proposal to amend the Labor Standard Law included various schemes designed to increase labor market flexibility, systems such as mass dismissal of employees caused by business restructuring or slow down. Although there were efforts made to legalize drastic measures such as mass dismissals and "employment at will" for the sake of market flexibility, the efforts failed. The new Law does, however, include a number of measure designed to promote labor market flexibility, such as a varied work schedule system that permits the employer to deny paying an overtime premium to employee so long as the total number of work hours conforms with the standard work hour defined in the law.
b. Union Tactics and Strategy
Despite the Labor law amendment and the enactment of "Workers Participation and Labor Management Cooperation Law" that encourages cooperation rather than the confrontational type of labor relations, the business community and organized labor in general appear willing to continue fighting with each other rather than adopt a conciliatory posture. It is especially true in businesses whose employees are organized and affiliated with the more independent national trade union confederation, KCTU. Corporate boards and executives of the firms where KCTU unions are formed have been doing whatever is necessary to rid themselves of these unions. Unions, on the other hand, have begun to counter with corporate campaigns against employers who do not provide reasonable wages, hours, and working conditions, or who use adversarial tactics to thwart organizing campaigns and collective activities. Tactics by unions include not only work stoppage but placing pressures on enterprises that do business with antiunion firms, conducting adverse publicity campaigns against selected firms, enlisting the support and sympathy of church groups, defeating attempts by private investors and anti-union firms to obtain industrial revenue and holding consumer boycotts against firms that oppose organized workers--but seldom with any success.
Although many of these tactics are legally banned, nevertheless they are being used to circumvent the ineffectiveness of the labor law. Such tactics may not be in the best interest of either the labor movement or business. Resources used in union management battles may, of course, be better spent fighting a more serious threat: increasing our competitive edge among firms operating within the global marketplace.
Should there be no change in either economic, political, or legal factors, or in the mid-set of decision markers both business and especially in government, or unless labor leaders and employers agree to work together and develop workplace innovations that focus on union-management cooperation, the number of organized workers will likely continue to decline through the future. If employers and unionists decide to pursue cooperative efforts, such efforts will have to focus on making Korean firms more productive and competitive relative to competing firms in other countries, not only in this region but also to those of industrially advanced countries. It seems that there are several conditions that are needed for union-management cooperative efforts to work. Among other these are:
1.
Introduction of a legal framework that will help workers enjoy their rights and also help to increase the national competitive edge by maintaining a balance between "basic rights and economic efficiency"
2.
Leaders of the union movement need to realize that the adversarial nature of labor relations is no longer feasible: cooperating with management must not be viewed as a sign that union leaders are "selling out"
3.
Management also needs to realize that in spite of progress in technologies and changes in methods of production, it is ultimately employees that hold the key to productivity gains.
All the parties of employment need to realize that they have a number of common problems, including non-unionized competitors and an increasingly legalistic and litigious business environment, as well as foreign competition.
Witnessing the rapid decline of private sector union membership in the United States, Peter Drucker remarked about the possible future of the organized worker:
The labor union can go on in three directions: If it does nothing, it may disappear - or shrink to the point where it becomes irrelevant. This is clearly the direction in which the British, Italian and French unions are moving but also most of those in the US.
Secondly, it can try to maintain itself through dominating the political power structure and having government impose compulsory union membership. Such power positions could be "co-determination", which gives the union a veto power over company management. This may appear to be a rational course. Indeed, the unions in Germany, Holland, and Scandinavia have clearly chosen it. If the unions' power results in their country's industry becoming noncompetitive, those unions will lose control as membership shrinks and public opinions turns against them. The German unions are already impaled on the horns of this dilemma.
There is a third possibility. The union can rethink its function. It might reinvent itself as the organ of society - and of the employing institution-concerned with building human potential and achievement, with optimizing the human resource altogether."(14)
Remarks on the future of unions in industrialized countries may be relevant also to unions in emerging industrializing countries inclusive of the unions in Korea.
Unions still have a large role as the representative of employees against the irregularities of management decisions and the abuse of management power in particular. But in order for the worker society to be able to harness national competition, the relationship would not be adversarial. And for a workers' society is to maintain representation of the working people it needs to re-engineer its structure so as to accommodate all the workers and develop the function of working with management on productivity, quality, and whatever else will help improve enterprise competitiveness, thus maintaining the members' jobs and protecting their incomes and opportunities.
NOTE
1. Emergency National Convention of the KCTU held on Sept 5th 1997, annaniously decided to nominate its president, Kwon Young-gil, as a presidential candidate at the forthcoming election and formally established a campaign committee within the KCTU on November 11, 1997. Unpublished proceedings of the KCTU executive committee meeting held in November 1997.
2. Hangyorae Daily, October 27, 1997
3. Park Young-Ki, chapter on Korea in Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Asia, ed. Stephen J. Deery at al, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne Australia, 1993. pp. 158 - 165.
4. Park Young-Ki, chapter on Korea, op cit, pp. 136 - 171.
5. Hankook Sahwae Yongkuso, Study on Labor in Korean society (Hankook Sahwae Nodongja Yongu), vol. II, 1989, Baeksan Suhdang, pp. 196 - 202 (Korean)
6. Ministry of Labor, Labor Unions in Korea (Junkook Nodongjohap Joghik Hyonwhag), 1997 Nov.
7. Hankook Sahwae Yonkuso, op cit, pp. 170 - 180
8. Shin Yoo-keun, Business Management in Korea (Hankook Ui Kyongyoung), bakyong sa, 1992, pp. 704 - 720 (Korean).
9. It was only after March 1997 that the Labor Union Law and Labor Dispute Adjustment Law were combined and became known as the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Law.
10. The Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Law (LULRAL), Article 81, Section 2.
11. Park Young-Ki, chapter on Korea, op cit, 136 - 171
12. In March 1997, The Labor Management Consultation Law was renamed the Workers'Participation and Promotion of Labor-Management Cooperation Law (WPPLMCWL). It empowered the Labor Management Council with the right of co-decision-making i some of the issues related to employment conditions. WPPLMCL Article 20.
13. Report of the ILO Committee of Freedom of Association submitted to the 269th Session of the ILO Governing Body. 1997 March, Case no. 1865.
14. Peter F. Drucker, "Peter Drucker Asks: Will Unions Ever be Useful Organs of Society?", Industry Week, March 20, 1989, p.22.
Table I. Trend of Labor Union Membership, 1963-1996
1963 1970 1980 1986 1987 1989 1990 1995
Union membership 224.4 473 948 1,036 1,267 1,932 1,887 1,615
('000s)
Number of Individual 2,150 3,500 2,618 2,658 4,086 7,883 7,698 6,606
Unions
Organizational rate 20.3 20.0 20.1 15.5 17.3 23.7 21.5 15.3
(%)
Note:Organizational rate = unionised employees
constantly employed in all
industries except farming
Source:Ministry of Labor, Year Book of Labor Statistics. KLI, Labor Statistics 1997
Table II. Treand of Labor Dispute by cause, 1975-1997
Wage Wage Plantclosure, Dismissal Unfair
diliquency increase layoff and labour
work shortage practices
1975 32 42 7 10 19
1980 287 38 11 5 -
1986 48 75 11 34 16
1987 45 2,62 11 51 65
1990 10 167 6 18 -
1995 - 33 - 1 -
1996 1 19 - - -
1997 - - - - -
Employment
conditions
Other Total
1975 4 19 133
1980 14 52 407
1986 48 44 276
1987 566 382 3,749
1990 2 119 322
1995 - 5 39
1996 - 3 23
1997 - - 73
Note: Figure of 1997 represents from Jan. 1 to Nov. 11, 1997.
Source: Ministry of Labor, Year Book of Labor Statistics. KLI, Labor Statistics 1997.
Table III. Trends of Real Wage Increase by Countries
Korea Taipei Japan USA
1980 45.6 ( -) 49.3 ( -) 85.0 ( -) 103.5 ( -)
1985 59.4 ( 7.4) 64.2 (4.5) 91.0 ( 0.5) 106.5 ( 1.2)
1987 68.4 ( 8.3) 76.7 (9.2) 94.4 ( 2.4) 105.7 (-1.1)
1990 100.0 (10.7) 100.0 (8.8) 100.0 ( 1.4) 100.0 (-2.4)
1991 106.9 ( 6.9) 107.1 (7.1) 101.2 ( 1.2) 98.8 (-1.2)
1992 116.4 ( 8.9) 113.0 (5.5) 100.8 (-0.4) 99.0 ( 0.2)
1993 123.2 ( 5.8) 117.3 (3.8) 99.8 (-1.6) 99.5 ( 0.5)
1994 133.9 ( 8.7) 120.1 (2.4) 100.4 ( 1.3) 101.2 ( 1.7)
1995 140.8 ( 5.2) 122.3 (1.8) 103.7 ( 3.3) 99.9 (-1.3)
Note
1) real wage index = (nominal wage index ・consumer's price index) x 100
2) ( ) represents differential compared to preceding year.
Source: Ministry of Labor Statistics Report
US BLS, Monthly Labor Review
Table IV. Major Economic Indices
Unit 1962 1970 1980 1990
GNP 1 Billion won 3071.14 24,973 52,260.8 178,262.1
Per capita GNP 2 US$ 87.0 252 1,572 5,500
Real growth rate % 2.2 7.6 -4.8 9.0
Export Million US$ 54.8 835.2 17,504.9 64,500
Import 3 Million US$ 421.8 1,984.0 22,291.7 69,700
Population
1000 persons 25,498 32,241 38,124 43,793
(Mid-year average)
7,139 13,251 21,845 31,645
Urban 1000 persons
(28.0%) (41.1) (57.3) (74.0)
18,539 18,990 10,827 11,148
Rural 1000 persons
(72.0%) (58.9) (42.7) (26.0)
Population
% 2.96 1.97 1.57 0.97
increasing rate
Unit 1995 1996
GNP GNP＊1 Billion won 348,979.3 386,640.4
Per capita GNP＊2 US$ 10,037 10,500
Real growth rate % 8.9 7.1
Export＊3 Million US$ 125,078 129,715
Import＊3 Million US$ 135,119 150,339
Population
1000 persons 45,093 45,545
(Mid-year average)
40,242 40,853
Urban 1000 persons
(89.2) (89.6)
4,851 4,692
Rural 1000 persons
(10.8) (10.4)
Population
% 1.01 1.00
increasing rate
Notes:
1. all series on national accounts since 1970 are compiled at 1985 constant prices, while those before 1970 are at 1980 constant prices. Figures before and after 1970, therefore, are not directly comparable.
2. All figures are based on current prices.
3. Based on figures of customs clearance.
Source: Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Ecomonically Active Population Survey, 1989; Bank of Korea, Annual Report on Economic Statics, 1990. National Accounts 1990.